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Abstract 
 
Conflict can cause negative externalities to arise, and this can result in economic 
loss. Such externalities are also thought to influence individuals’ perceptions about 
economic issues. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provide their hypothesis that the 
political elite extend the franchise to avoid revolution or social unrest. For the 
purpose of empirically testing this hypothesis, the present paper explores how the 
degree of conflict between rich and poor people is associated with individual 
preferences for income redistribution and perceptions regarding income differences. 
This paper used cross-country individual-level data covering 26 countries and 
consisting of 20,000 observations. After controlling for individual characteristics, 
the key findings are as follows: (1) an individual is more likely to prefer income 
redistribution policy in countries where people perceive conflict between rich and 
poor to be high; (2) an individual is more likely to consider the income difference to 
be too large in countries where people perceive conflict between rich and poor to be 
high; and (3) after dividing the sample into high- and low-income earners, the above 
key findings are only obtained for high-income earners and not for low-income 
earners. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A Kuznetz curve demonstrates that inequality increases and then decreases in 
the process of economic development (Kuznetz, 1955). This claim is mainly derived 
from historical observations rather than theoretical explanations. The seminal work 
of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provided a theoretical model that suggested that 
the expansion of voting rights leads to redistribution policies. This theory explains 
that democratization triggers the implementation of redistribution policies, which 
results in a fall in income inequality. Historical evidence from Western societies 
shows that the elite ran oligarchies and enjoyed their benefits at the expense of the 
rest of society. At a later date, these oligarchical political systems were reformed by 
extending the franchise. However, such political reform is thought to enhance 
income redistribution by increasing the tax on the elite, that is, the wealthy 
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Thus, this reduces the interest of the elite. If this is 
true, the elite are opposed to political reform to maintain their interest. This also 
raises the question of why the elite would extend the franchise. The main reason for 
the transformation from an oligarchy to a democracy is that “the elite extended the 
franchise in order to avoid a revolution or social unrest” (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000, p. 1168). 
Today, more countries than ever are undergoing democratization. However, 
income inequality continues to exist and thus there are rich and poor groups within 
a country. In modern democratic societies, situations similar to oligarchies persist. 
That is, social unrest followed by inequality seems to threaten the position of the 
wealthy1. Accordingly, conflict between rich and poor is brought to public notice. 
Current research has found via statistical methods a positive relationship between 
economic inequality and social conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2011; Macours, 2011)2. 
Social conflict possibly leads people to consider income inequality to be higher than 
the acceptable level. In this situation, people prefer redistributive policies to 
decrease the social unrest. The social conflict might inevitably influence perceived 
income differences between groups and individuals’ preferences for a redistribution 
                                                   
1 Between 1990 and 2000 in Rwanda, as an outcome of various conflicts including civil 
war and genocide, many people lost their lands and homes, especially those who were 
land-rich before the conflict. Wealthier provinces experienced lower, even negative, 
economic growth after the conflict (Justino and Verwimp, 2013). 
2 A number of theoretical models show relations between inequality and conflict 
although conclusions vary among researchers (Robinson, 2001; Hutter, 2003; De Luca 
and Sekeris, 2012).  
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policy. Voors et al. (2012) conducted a field experiment and found that exposure to 
conflict impacts on perceptions such as discount rates. Furthermore, they provided 
evidence that those who experienced conflict display altruistic behavior towards 
their neighbors. 
Some empirical works have examined the determinants of perceived income 
inequality (e.g., Tomioka and Outake, 2005; Meagher and Wilson, 2008; Xu and 
Gerand, 2010). A large number of existing works attempt to ascertain the 
determinants of preference for redistribution and to identify the mechanism for 
such a preference (e.g., Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and Grüner, 2002, 
Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Guuliano, 
2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Dahlberg et al., 2012; 
Bjornskov et al., 2013; Yamamura, 2012, 2014). Meager and Wilson (2008) 
compared the perceived income differences and preference for redistribution by 
suggesting basic statistics. Although empirical works have not been able to provide 
sufficient evidence stating how social conflict is jointly associated with the perceived 
income difference and preference for redistribution, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 
2001) developed a theoretical model to clarify the relationship between conflict, 
inequality and redistribution3. Thus, it is worthwhile to empirically investigate the 
relationship in modern society.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the influence of the degree of conflict between 
rich and poor on not only individuals’ perceived income difference but also on 
preference for income redistribution. Furthermore, historical observations show 
that social unrest has a large effect on the elite’s preference for democratization and 
therefore redistribution. In modern society, inequality has a different influence on 
the happiness of the rich and poor (Alesina et al., 2004). In Sweden, the effect of 
immigration on one’s preference for redistribution differs between different income 
groups (Dahlberg et al., 2012). Therefore, this paper investigates how the effect of 
perceived conflict is different between high- and low-income groups.  
For this purpose, the present paper uses data from the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP), which includes more than 20,000 observations. The key 
findings of this paper via various specifications estimated by an ordered probit 
model are as follows: (1) an individual is more likely to prefer income redistribution 
policy in countries where people perceive conflict between rich and poor to be high; 
                                                   
3 There are number of theoretical studies concerning democracy and conflict (e.g., 
Przeworski, 2005; Aslaksen and Torvik, 2006; Zhaohui, 2007; Adachi and Nakamura, 
2008).  
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(2) an individual is more likely to consider income differences to be too large in 
countries where people perceive conflict between rich and poor to be high; (3) after 
dividing the sample into high- and low-income earners, the above two key finding 
are only obtained for high-income earners and not for low-income earners. The 
contribution of this paper is that it empirically examines the mechanism proposed 
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) using recent micro-level data from modern 
societies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the testable 
hypotheses are presented. Data and the empirical method are explained in Section 
3. Section 4 presents the estimation results and their interpretation. The final 
section offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses  
 
The opportunity cost of theft is low for people with a low wage rate. That is, even 
if they are arrested and then sent to prison, the reduction of their income during the 
period is not so large and therefore the economic damage is low. Hence, in 
comparison with revenue from theft, its cost is smaller if the wage rate is 
sufficiently low. Furthermore, poor people have emotional hostility towards the rich 
if the conflict between rich and poor is high. This in turn also provides poor people 
with an incentive to commit theft against the rich. Therefore, when conflict between 
rich and poor is high, poor people are likely to engage in criminal behavior: poor 
people break into the homes of rich people. Even if there is no economic motivation, 
poor people’s hostility possibly causes them to commit violent crimes against the 
rich. Naturally, rich people are threatened by such possibilities and are then 
exposed to the danger of criminal acts, for example, attacks by poor people. 
Therefore, income inequality is thought to lead to conflict between the rich and poor, 
resulting in a negative externality on rich people. Under the condition that such 
externality does not exist, rich people do not prefer income redistribution because 
the tax burden reduces their disposable income. However, assuming that the 
negative externality of income inequality leads to a large cost, such as the risk of 
theft or violent crime, rich people attempt to reduce the externality. For instance, if 
income inequality decreases, the externality becomes small. Therefore, rich people 
prefer redistribution policies when the externality is sufficiently large. Here, 
Hypothesis 1 is advanced: 
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Hypothesis 1:  
An individual is likely to prefer income redistribution if he (she) lives in a country 
where the conflict between rich and poor is high. This tendency is remarkable for 
individuals with a high income. 
 
An individual’s happiness is observed to be negatively associated with the income 
level of others (Luttmer, 2005). If this holds true, larger inequality leads rich people 
to feel happier. However, social unrest rises as inequality increases, leading to a 
negative influence on rich people’s happiness (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). Thus, 
this externality is regarded as the cost of inequality for rich people. Inequality is the 
optimum level when the marginal benefit of inequality is equal to its marginal cost. 
At the optimum level of inequality, the conflict between rich and poor is also at an 
optimum level. In other words, when the conflict is higher than the optimum level, 
inequality is perceived to be larger than the optimum level. This inference leads to 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
An individual is likely to think that the income difference is too large if he (she) 
lives in a country where the conflict between rich and poor is high. This tendency is 
remarkable for individuals with high incomes. 
 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
ISSP data, which provides individual-level data, are used in the present paper. 
ISSP surveys have been conducted several times since the 1980s. The theme of ISSP 
surveys changes each year; ISSP 2009, which was conducted in August 2008, 
focused on the issue of social inequality. Thus, ISSP 2009 provides valuable data to 
examine the hypotheses proposed in the previous section. ISSP 2009 covers 26 
countries and in each country respondents are asked various questions concerning 
demography, social status, education level, economic condition and subjective 
perception. The total sample size of ISSP 2009 includes over 20,000 observations, 
and is regarded as a sufficient sample size for statistical analysis4. The majority of 
                                                   
4 The original sample consisted of 54,733 observations. However, data regarding the 
key variables were not available for all for all respondents. Hence, the sample size used 
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respondents are aged 18 years and older5. Sampling procedures differed among 
individual countries: some were simple sample and others were multi-stage 
stratified random samples. The mode of interview also differed among countries: 
some were face-to-face interviews, paper-and-pencil or postal surveys. In general, 
the fieldwork to collect the sample was conducted between 2008 and 20106. 
The variables used in the regression estimations are shown in Table 1, which 
provides definitions and basic statistics (mean, standard deviation). 
One ISSP question concerning conflict (a key variable in the present study) 
asked: 
“There are conflicts between poor and rich people. In your opinion, in your 
country, how much conflict is there between poor and rich people?” To answer the 
question, respondents could choose one of four responses ( which are regarded as a 
proxy for the degree of perceived conflict), ranging from 1 (there are no conflicts) to 
4 (very strong conflicts). 
When the effect of individually perceived conflict on perceived income differences 
is examined, the causality between them is ambiguous because the perceived 
conflict is considered an endogenous variable. That is, those who perceived that the 
difference is large are likely to perceive conflict to be high. This inevitably causes 
endogeneity bias. To avoid such bias, this paper uses the degree of perceived conflict 
in the country of residence, rather than the individual’s trust level. The average 
values within each country are calculated and these values are used as a measure of 
the degree of conflict. 
For the purpose of capturing the economic condition of a country of residence, 
GINI (Gini coefficient before tax and transfers), GDP and POP (population) are used. 
GINI data were sourced from World Bank data7. GDP and POP data were collected 
from the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for International Comparisons, Penn 
World Table 7.18. This paper used 2008 data from these sources, being the year 
when the ISSP 2009 was conducted. The information regarding individual 
                                                                                                                                                     
in the estimation was reduced to 20,000. 
5 Respondents from Finland, Norway, and Sweden are aged 15–74, 19–0, and 17–79, 
respectively. Those of Japan are aged 16 years and older. 
6 Fieldwork in Italy was conducted between 2011 and 2012. 
7 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=1 (accessed on June 12, 
2013). 
8 The data are available at the website of Penn World Table 
https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt71/pwt71_form.php (accessed on August 25, 
2013). 
 
 7 
 
characteristics sourced from ISSP data was matched with country characteristics 
such as the degree of perceived conflict, GINI, GDP and POP. Thus, we were able to 
investigate how the characteristics of the residential country influence an 
individual’s preference for income redistribution and perceived income difference. 
With respect to individual characteristics, PRDIST are proxies for preferences 
for income redistribution. A question from the ISSP 2009 asked respondents about 
their degree of agreement with the statement that government should reduce 
income inequality: there were five response options, ranging from “1 (strongly 
disagree)” to “5 (strongly agree)”. PRDIST represents the values the respondents 
chose. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of PRDIST, and shows that the number 
of respondents who chose 1, 2 or 3 is distinctly smaller than those who chose 4 or 5. 
This implies that the shape of the histogram is skewed towards the right. In the 
ISSP 2009, respondents were also asked about their degree of agreement with the 
statement that income differences in their country are too large. There were five 
response options, ranging from “1 (strongly disagree)” to “5 (strongly agree)”. 
DIFINCOM represents the values the respondents chose. The distribution of 
DIFINCOM is demonstrated in Figure 2; the larger values show that more people 
chose those responses. Thus, most people perceive the income difference to be too 
large. Considering Figures 1 and 2 shows that people are more inclined to prefer 
redistribution and perceive the income difference to be too large.  
It is plausible to argue that political ideology is one of determinants concerning 
preferences for redistribution and so should be controlled for when preferences for 
income redistribution are estimated (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Yamamura, 2012). 
The ISSP contains the following question: “Where on the following scale would you 
say your political views lie?” There are five response options: “1 (Liberal)” to “5 
(Conservative)”. Based on the responses to that question, a proxy was constructed to 
capture political ideology effect. Political views are captured by dummies: CONSV_5 
equals 1 when the response is 5, otherwise 0; CONSV_2, CONSV_3, and CONSV_4 
are defined in the same manner.  
 
3.2. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
Table 2 shows that respondents belonging to a higher income group are less 
inclined to prefer redistribution and to perceive the income difference to be larger. 
Hence, relative income level is associated with an individual’s perception. In Figure 
3, the vertical axis shows the average preference for redistribution (PRDIST) within 
a country. In Figure 4, the vertical axis shows the average perceived difference in 
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income (DIFINCOM) within a country. In Figures 3 and 4, the horizontal rows show 
the average perceived conflict (CONFLICT) within a country. A cursory examination 
of Figure 3 reveals a positive association between CONFLICT and PRDIST. 
Similarly, Figure 4 shows a positive association between CONFLICT and 
DIFINCOM. These are in line with the hypotheses raised in Section 2. However, 
these relationships are observed when individual characteristics are not controlled. 
A closer examination calls for a regression analysis using individual-level data 
matched with the characteristics of one’s country of residence.   
For the purpose of examining the hypotheses proposed the previous section, the 
estimated function of the baseline model takes the following form: 
PRDIST(or DIFINC)ik = α1 CONFLICTk + α2GINIk + X’Β+εi      
X: Vector of characteristics of country’s and individual’s characteristics  
Β: Vector of coefficients of country’s and individual’s characteristics,  
where PRDIST(or DIFINC)ik represents the dependent variable for individual i and 
country k. Regression parameters are represented by α. As explained earlier, values 
for PRDIST and DIFINC range from 1 to 5 and an ordered probit model was used to 
conduct the estimations. The error term is represented by εi. It is reasonable to 
assume that the observations may be spatially correlated within a country, as the 
country of one agent may well relate to the preference of another in the same 
country. To control such spatial correlation in line with this assumption, the Stata 
cluster command was used and z-statistics were calculated using robust standard 
errors. The advantage of this method is that the magnitude of spatial correlation 
can be unique to each country. 
Regarding the control variables included in X, GDP and POP are included to 
capture the economic condition of each country. Furthermore, according to the 
“prospect of upward mobility” (POUM) theory (Bénabou and Ok, 2001), people who 
expect to move up the income scale are unlikely to support a redistribution policy 
even when they are currently poor. Hence, the sign for GDP is likely to become 
negative when PRDIST is the dependent variable. In contrast, people do not 
perceive the income difference as high. Hence, the coefficient of GDP is likely to 
become negative when DIFINCOM is assessed. If inequality increases social 
problems such as crime, then inequality leads people to perceive the income 
difference to be large and prefer redistribution. Thus, the coefficient of GINI is 
predicted to be positive in the estimation when PRDIST and DIFINCOM are 
dependent variables.  
Turning to the economic condition of individuals, people tend to compare their 
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income with that of surrounding people (Luttmer, 2005). As exhibited in Table 2, an 
individual’s income position seems appropriate to capture the income effect. Hence, 
the relative income levels in each country are considered. For this purpose, three 
dummy variables are constructed: HIGHINCOM (respondents belong to the 25th 
percentile income group), MIDINCOM (respondents belong to the income group 
between the 25th and 75th percentiles), and LOWINCOM (respondents belong to 
the 75th percentile income group). In addition, to capture wealth level, dummy 
variables to measure savings, stocks and bonds are constructed: NOSTOC, 
SAMLSTOC, MEDSTOC, LARSTOC and TOPSTOC. Furthermore, dummy 
variables are created to measure home or apartment: DEBTHOM, NOSHOM, 
SMALHOM, MEDHOM, LARGHOM and TOPHOM. Previous studies controlled for 
individuals’ demographic and social status characteristics (e.g., Ravallian and 
Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and Gruüner, 2002; Ohtake and Tomioka, 2004; Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2005; Rainer and Seidler, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Yamamura, 
2012a). Thus, this paper incorporates AGE, SCHOOL, MALE, MARRI, and DIVO 
as independent variables. Perceptions about inequality and income difference are 
thought to depend not only on economic conditions but also on individuals’ political 
views. For the purpose of capturing political views, CONSV_2–CONSV_5 are 
included and CONSV_1 (liberal view) is the reference group. Liberal views are 
generally considered to support left-wing policies such as political income 
redistribution. Accordingly, the coefficients of CONSV_2–CONSV_5 are expected to 
be negative. In addition, the absolute value of the coefficient CONSV_5 is expected 
to be the largest among them. In addition, types of employment should be 
considered. Public sector employees would not like to lose their jobs as a result of a 
government downsize. Hence, public sector workers are thought to have a positive 
view about the role of government because they are likely to keep their jobs. With 
the aim to capture such an effect, respondents’ jobs are captured by incorporating 
WOKGOV, WOKPUB, WOKFIRM, WOKSELF, WOKOTHE and WOKNO. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
The estimation results are exhibited in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The results of Table 3 
are based on the full sample. After dividing the sample into high- and low-income 
groups, Table 4 shows the results using the low-income sample while Table 5 shows 
the results using the high-income sample. Furthermore, in each table, columns 
(1)–(3) present results of PRDIST while columns (4)–(6) present the results of 
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DIFINCOM. For a robustness check of the results, various independent variables 
are used in different columns. In columns (1) and (4) of each table, all control 
variables are incorporated as independent variables (however, the sample size is 
smaller than in other columns because information about some control variables 
was not available). In each table, the coefficients of the independent variables are 
reported9.  
Table 3 shows that the coefficient of CONFLICT is positive, being statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level in columns (1)–(3). This is consistent with the 
prediction concerning the preference for redistribution. In contrast, the coefficient of 
CONFLICT is positive and statistically significant in columns (4)–(5). This is 
congruent with the prediction concerning the perceived income difference. Turning 
to the control variables, the results of the individual-level variables are shown in 
Table 3. Consistent with Table 2, HIGHINCOM is negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level in columns (1)–(6). That is, high-income earners 
are less likely to support a redistribution policy and they consider the income 
difference to be small. LARSTOC and TOPSTOC are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level in all columns. This is congruent with the 
prediction that high-income earners do not prefer redistribution and they do not 
perceive the income difference to be large. With respect to political views, CONSV_2, 
CONSV3, CONSV4 and CONSV5 are negative and statistically significant in all 
estimations. This is convincing because conservative people are thought to be 
against progressive policies such as income redistribution. Concerning employment 
type, on the condition that WOKGOV is the default variable, WOKPUB, WOKFIRM, 
WOKSELF and WOKOTHE are negative in columns (1) and (4). Furthermore, 
WOKFIRM and WOKSELF are statistically significant. This implies that compared 
with other kinds of employment, government employees are more likely to prefer 
redistribution and perceive the income difference to be large. That is, government 
employees consider that it is the government’s role to decrease inequality, thus 
increasing the need for government and thereby protecting their jobs. 
With respect to Tables 4 and 5, the results for CONFLICT relate to Hypotheses 1 
                                                   
9 The marginal effects of PRIDST (and DIFINCOM) can be calculated for each value 
(Greene, 2008, p. 831–835). That is, their marginal effect on the probability that 
PRDIST (and DIFINCOM) is 5, their marginal effect on the probability that PRDIST 
(and DIFINCOM) is 4, their marginal effect on the probability that PRDIST (and 
DIFINCOM) is 3, their marginal effect on the probability that PRDIST (and 
DIFINCOM) is 2, and their marginal effect on the probability that PRDIST (and 
DIFINCOM) is 1. Please note, the results of the marginal effects are not reported 
because of space limitations. 
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and 2. Table 4 reports that the coefficient of CONFLICT is positive in columns 
(1)–(6). However, it is interesting to observe that CONFLICT is not statistically 
significant, with the exception of column (3). Based on this result, the following 
argument can be derived: for high-income earners, the perceived conflict is not 
associated with a preference for redistribution and perceived income difference. In 
contrast, Table 5 shows that the coefficient of CONFLICT is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all columns. Therefore, it can be 
argued that for high-income earners, the perceived conflict is positively associated 
with a preference for redistribution and a perceived income difference. Furthermore, 
the coefficient of CONFLICT is approximately 0.70 in columns (1)–(3) of Table 5, 
which is two times larger than the coefficient of CONFLICT in columns (1)–(3) of 
Table 4. Similarly, the coefficient of CONFLICT is approximately 1 in columns 
(4)–(6) of Table 5, being four times larger than the coefficient of CONFLICT shown 
in columns (4)–(6) of Table 5. To sum the various estimated results presented thus 
far, the estimation results examined in this section strongly support Hypotheses 1 
and 2.  
Expressive behavior (Hillman, 2010) explains, to some extent, the reason why 
the effect of social conflict has a different effect on an individual’s perceived income 
difference and preference for redistribution. According to the expressive voting 
hypothesis, individuals vote to express their views regarding particular issues, even 
if they do not intend to affect the outcomes of the election (e.g., Tullock, 1971; 
Copeland and Laband, 2002; Sobel and Wagner, 2004). As a consequence, 
individuals vote for a certain policy despite the fact that the actual implementation 
of the policy would reduce their material utility. High-income earners consider 
income inequality to be too large, which expresses their sympathy to low-income 
earners. High-income earners’ support for income redistribution is thought to 
reflect their support for the generosity of the welfare state. These expressions 
increase the utility of high-income earners. The estimation results in this paper 
were obtained using survey data. Survey responses can be interpreted as expressive 
because the responses have no effect on redistribution policies in any way. There is 
no material loss from expressing generosity regarding the welfare state even when 
expressive utility increases by signaling conformity with group-defined equality 
norms (Tullock, 1971).  
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5. Conclusions 
 
Conflicts cause negative externalities, which in turn result in economic losses. 
Such externalities are also thought to influence individuals’ perceptions about 
economic issues. The larger the conflict between rich and poor, the more 
high-income earners are likely to be the target of criminal behavior. For instance, 
high-income earners are more inclined to fear burglary. Social unrest puts pressure 
on high-income earners to reconcile such conflict. Thus, the argument in this paper 
is that high-income earners consider inequality to be too large when the conflict 
increases to a level that threatens their property and safety. However, high-income 
earners support income redistribution policies if the burden of progressive tax is 
smaller than the cost of the externality of conflict.  
To test these inferences, this paper explored how the degree of conflict between 
rich and poor is associated with individual preferences for income redistribution as 
well as perceived differences in income. Cross-country individual-level data were 
used for statistical estimations. After controlling for individual characteristics, the 
key findings are as follows: (1) an individual is more likely to prefer an income 
redistribution policy in countries where people perceive the conflict between rich 
and poor to be high; (2) an individual is more likely to consider the income 
difference to be too large in countries where people perceive the conflict between 
rich and poor to be high; (3) after dividing the sample into high- and low-income 
earners, the above two finding are only obtained for high-income earners and not for 
low-income earners. 
The main contribution of the present paper is twofold: first, this paper is the first 
to investigate the effect of conflict between rich and poor, not only regarding 
perceived income differences but also on preferences for redistribution; second, 
these effects differ according to income group. Following previous studies 
(Yamamura 2012, 2014; Dahlberg et al., 2012), this paper sheds light on differences 
in income levels to investigate how socio-economic circumstances affect perceptions 
regarding the welfare state. The findings of this paper empirically support the claim 
theoretically proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). 
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Figure 3. Association between average perceived conflict and average preference 
for income redistribution 
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Figure 4. Association between average perceived conflict and average perceived 
income difference in country of residence 
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     Table 1 
Definitions and basic statistics of each variable 
 Definitions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Country 
characteristics 
   
CONFLICT CONFLICT is the average value of proxy 
for degree of conflict in a country 
 
Question: In all countries, there are 
conflicts between poor and rich people. In 
your opinion, in <country> how much 
conflict is there between poor and rich 
people? 
There are 5 responses, which are regarded 
as proxies for degree of conflict:  
1 (there are no conflicts) – 5 (very high 
conflicts) 
2.44 0.34 
GINI Gini coefficients before taxes and transfers 
in 2008 (World Bank) 
0.45 0.04 
GDP GDP (Millions of US dollars)  
 
34,069 8,316 
POP Population (thousands) 55,333   81,046 
Individual 
characteristics 
   
PRIDIST 
 
Degree of agreement with the statement 
that the government should reduce income 
inequality: 
1 (strongly disagree) – 5 (strongly agree) 
3.61 1.21 
DIFINCOM Degree of agreement with the statement 
that income differences in country are too 
large: 
1 (strongly disagree) – 5 (strongly agree) 
4.08 0.99 
HIGINCOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s household 
income is higher than 25th percentile 
(Group > 25 percentile), otherwise 0. 
0.26 ___ 
MIDINCOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s household 
income is between 25th and 75th 
percentile of household income (25th 
percentile > = Group > = 75 the percentile), 
otherwise 0 
0.59 ___ 
LOWINCOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s household 
income is lower than 75th percentile 
(Group < 75th percentile), otherwise 0 
0.15 ___ 
DEBTSTOC Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth 
(savings, stocks, or bonds) is just debt, 
otherwise 0 
0.10 ___ 
NOSTOC Equals 1 if the respondent has no wealth 
(savings, stocks, or bonds), otherwise 0 
0.20 ___ 
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SMALSTOC Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth 
(savings, stocks, or bonds) is larger than 0 
but smaller than the expected mean 
wealth, otherwise 0 
0.41 ___ 
MEDSTOC Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth 
(savings, stocks, or bonds) is equivalent to 
the expected mean wealth using external 
information, otherwise 0 
0.05 ___ 
LARSTOC Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth 
(savings, stocks, or bonds) is larger than 
the expected mean wealth but smaller 
than the highest category, otherwise 0 
0.19 ___ 
TOPSTOC Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth 
(savings, stocks, or bonds) belongs to the 
highest category (no upper limitation), 
otherwise 0 
0.05 ___ 
DEBTHOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth (home 
or apartment) is just debt, otherwise 0 
0.06 ___ 
NOSHOM Equals 1 if the respondent has no wealth 
(home or apartment), otherwise it takes 0 
0.18 ___ 
SMALHOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth (home 
or apartment) is larger than 0 but smaller 
than the expected mean wealth, otherwise 
0 
0.34 ___ 
MEDHOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth (home 
or apartment) is equivalent to the 
expected mean wealth using external 
information, otherwise 0. 
0.08 ___ 
LARGHOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth (home 
or apartment) is larger than the expected 
mean wealth but smaller than the highest 
category, otherwise 0 
0.31 ___ 
TOPHOM Equals 1 if the respondent’s wealth (home 
or apartment) belongs to the highest 
category (no upper limitation), otherwise 0 
0.03 ___ 
AGE Ages 49.9 15.1 
SCHOOL 
 
Years of schooling 13.3 4.03 
MALE Equals 1 if respondent is male, otherwise 0 0.51 ___ 
MARRI Equals 1 if respondent is married, 
otherwise 0 
0.62 ___ 
DIVO Equals 1 if respondent is divorced, 
otherwise 0 
0.08 ___ 
CONSV_1 Concerning political views, equals 1 if 
respondent chooses 1, otherwise 0 
1 (Liberal) – 5 (Conservative) 
0.09 ___ 
CONSV_2 Concerning political views, equals 1 if 
respondent chooses 2, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative) – 5 ( progressive) 
0.35 ___ 
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CONSV_3 Concerning political views, equals 1 if 
respondent chooses 3, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.21 ___ 
CONSV_4 Concerning political views, equals 1 if 
respondent chooses 4, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.31 ___ 
CONSV_5 Concerning political views, equals 1 if 
respondent chooses 5, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.04 ___ 
WOKGOV Equals 1 if respondent works for 
government, otherwise 0 
0.26 ___ 
WOKPUB Equals 1 if respondent works for a publicly 
owned firm, otherwise 0 
0.07 ___ 
WOKFIRM Equals 1 if respondent does not work for 
government, a publicly owned firm and is 
not self-employed, otherwise 0 
0.52 ___ 
WOKSELF 
 
Equals 1 if respondent is self-employed, 
otherwise 0 
0.14 ___ 
WOKOTHE Equals 1 if respondent works for other 
than WOKGOV, WOKPUB, WOKFIRM, 
WOKSELF, otherwise 0. Other works 
(not ) 
0.002 ___ 
WOKNO Equals 1 if respondent is not in paid 
employment, otherwise 0. 
0.005 ___ 
Note: GINI is obtained from OECD 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD#. accessed on June 27, 2013).  
GDP and POP are from Penn World Table 7.1 
(http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table. accessed on June 27, 2013). 
Other variables sourced from ISSP 2009. 
 Sample is equivalent to that used in column (1) of Table 3. Question about political 
position varies according to country. However, in general it asks “To what degree do you 
think yourself politically liberal or conservative?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
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             Preference for redistribution and perceived income difference: 
average values of each income category. 
 
 PRIDIST 
 
DIFINCOM 
High-income group: 
Group > 25th percentile. 
3.78   4.19 
Middle-income group: 
25th percentile > = Group > = 75th 
percentile. 
3.82   4.21 
Low-income group: 
75th percentile > = Group 
  4.01     4.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Table 3 
Estimation results based on full sample (ordered probit) 
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 Estimation for preference for 
income redistribution 
Dependent variable: PRIDIST 
 Estimation for perceived income 
difference 
Dependent variable: DIFINCOM 
    (1) (2)  (3)   (4) (5)  (6) 
Country 
characteristics 
       
CONFLICT 0.79*** 
(3.94) 
0.74*** 
(3.64) 
0.67*** 
(4.37) 
 0.63** 
(2.50) 
0.59** 
(2.51) 
0.56*** 
(2.67) 
GINI 3.13** 
(2.58) 
3.19*** 
(2.61) 
2.99** 
(3.24) 
 1.66 
(1.16) 
1.79 
(1.26) 
1.75 
(1.42) 
Ln (GDP) −0.63** 
(−2.37) 
−0.59** 
(−2.28) 
−0.58*** 
(−3.33) 
 −0.64*** 
(−2.68) 
−0.64*** 
(−2.84) 
−0.63*** 
(−3.51) 
Ln (POP) −0.18** 
(−2.40) 
−0.17** 
(−2.30) 
−0.15** 
(−2.54) 
 −0.06 
(−0.90) 
−0.06 
(−0.83) 
−0.07 
(−1.21) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
MIDINCOM <Reference group> 
 
 <Reference group> 
 
HIGINCOM −0.18*** 
(−4.55) 
−0.19*** 
(−4.50) 
−0.18*** 
(−4.55) 
 −0.22*** 
(−5.32) 
−0.22*** 
(−5.28) 
−0.20*** 
(−4.70) 
LOWINCOM 0.05 
(1.40) 
0.06 
(1.26) 
0.05 
(1.40) 
 0.001 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
0.007 
(0.20) 
DEBTSTOC <Reference group> 
 
 <Reference group> 
 
NOSTOC 0.01 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
−0.001 
(−0.04) 
 0.03 
(0.36) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
−0.004 
(−0.06) 
SMALSTOC −0.07 
(−1.58) 
−0.07 
(−1.44) 
−0.12*** 
(−2.71) 
 −0.03 
(−0.49) 
−0.05 
(−0.82) 
−0.10 
(−1.65) 
MEDSTOC −0.06 
(−1.01) 
−0.07 
(−1.16) 
−0.15*** 
(−2.90) 
 −0.10 
(−1.38) 
−0.12* 
(−1.74) 
−0.19*** 
(−3.24) 
LARSTOC −0.21*** 
(−4.72) 
−0.21*** 
(−4.62) 
−0.25*** 
(−5.68) 
  −0.19*** 
 (−2.93) 
 −0.21*** 
 (−3.47) 
 −0.25*** 
 (−4.05) 
TOPSTOC −0.32*** 
(3.29) 
−0.31*** 
(2.94) 
−0.43*** 
(3.84) 
  −0.35*** 
 (−5.35) 
 −0.38*** 
 (−5.39) 
 −0.46*** 
 (−5.77) 
DEBTHOM <Reference group> 
 
 <Reference group> 
 
NOSHOM −0.01 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
−0.01 
(−0.28) 
 0.05 
(0.61) 
0.06 
(0.63) 
0.07 
(0.88) 
SMALHOM −0.06 
(−0.93) 
−0.04 
(−0.70) 
−0.07* 
(−1.82) 
 0.01 
(0.20) 
0.03 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
MEDHOM 0.02 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.41) 
−0.02 
(−0.28) 
 0.09 
(0.80) 
0.10 
(0.91) 
0.07 
(0.73) 
LARGHOM −0.09 
(−0.71) 
−0.08 
(−0.78) 
−0.14 
(−1.54) 
 −0.01 
 (−0.05) 
0.01 
 (0.05) 
−0.02 
 (−0.28) 
TOPHOM −0.13 
(−1.13) 
−0.13 
(−1.26) 
−0.24** 
(−2.35) 
 −0.19 
(−1.60) 
−0.18 
(−1.56) 
−0.21* 
(−1.93) 
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AGE 0.003*** 
(2.60) 
0.003*** 
(3.04) 
0.003*** 
(3.70) 
 0.007*** 
(5.70) 
0.007*** 
(5.88) 
0.006*** 
(5.89) 
SCHOOL 
 
−0.02*** 
(−2.86) 
−0.02** 
(−2.43) 
−0.01** 
(−2.27) 
 −0.01*** 
(−2.67) 
−0.01** 
(−2.52) 
−0.01** 
(−2.31) 
MALE −0.05* 
(−1.94) 
−0.07*** 
(−2.81) 
−0.09*** 
(−4.00) 
 −0.07*** 
(−2.67) 
−0.09*** 
(−3.20) 
−0.10*** 
(−3.47) 
MARRI 0.01 
(0.65) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
 0.06* 
(1.86) 
0.06* 
(1.87) 
0.06** 
(2.32) 
DIVO −0.01 
(−0.39) 
−0.02 
(−0.55) 
−0.003 
(−0.09) 
 0.06 
(1.35) 
0.06 
(1.52) 
0.10*** 
(2.85) 
CONSV_1 <Reference group>  <Reference group> 
CONSV_2 −0.30*** 
(−2.81) 
−0.29*** 
(−2.84) 
  −0.29*** 
(−2.68) 
−0.26** 
(−2.50) 
 
CONSV_3 −0.54*** 
(−4.86) 
−0.54*** 
(−4.86) 
  −0.49*** 
(−4.13) 
−0.47*** 
(−4.00) 
 
CONSV_4 −0.86*** 
(−6.17) 
−0.87*** 
(−6.19) 
   −0.80*** 
 (−6.45) 
 −0.78*** 
 (−6.18) 
 
CONSV_5 −0.50*** 
(−3.01) 
−0.49*** 
(−3.01) 
  −0.49*** 
(−3.27) 
−0.46*** 
(−3.16) 
 
WOKGOV <Reference group>  <Reference group> 
 
WOKPUB −0.15** 
(−2.53) 
   −0.04 
(−0.65) 
  
WOKFIRM −0.14*** 
(−5.97) 
   −0.06** 
(−2.11) 
  
WOKSELF 
 
−0.19*** 
(−4.60) 
    −0.13*** 
 (−3.51) 
  
WOKOTHE −0.17 
(−0.44) 
   −0.27 
(−1.30) 
  
WOKNO −0.004 
(−0.03) 
   0.20* 
(1.84) 
  
Marginal effect 
of CONFLICT: 
Pr (Y = 5) 
0.24*** 
(3.84) 
0.23*** 
(3.52) 
0.22*** 
(4.19) 
 0.24** 
(2.52) 
0.22** 
(1.51) 
0.22**
* 
(2.66) 
Log 
pseudo-likeliho
od 
−18,924 −20,267 −28,391  −16,059 −17,155 −23,814 
Observations. 13,716 14,655 20,573  13,777 14,716 20,688 
Note: Values without parentheses are coefficients. Values in parentheses are 
z−statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered for per country. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
                                   Table 4 
Estimation results based on low-income sample (ordered probit) 
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 Estimation for preference for 
income redistribution 
Dependent variable: PRIDIST 
 Estimation for perceived income 
difference 
Dependent variable: DIFINCOM 
    (1) (2)  (3)   (4) (5)  (6) 
Country 
characteristics 
       
CONFLICT 0.32 
(1.21) 
0.28 
(0.97) 
0.39* 
(1.85) 
 0.25 
(1.08) 
0.23 
(0.98) 
0.32 
(1.45) 
GINI 2.43* 
(1.66) 
2.74* 
(1.83) 
3.05*** 
(2.71) 
 1.56 
(1.21) 
1.69 
(1.31) 
1.61 
(1.39) 
Ln (GDP) −0.71*** 
(−3.10) 
−0.71*** 
(−2.80) 
−0.60*** 
(−3.59) 
 −0.80*** 
(−3.44) 
−0.80*** 
(−3.15) 
−0.60*** 
(−2.98) 
Ln (POP) −0.15** 
(−2.14) 
−0.14* 
(−1.78) 
−0.13** 
(−2.05) 
 −0.07 
(−1.15) 
−0.05 
(−0.84) 
−0.06 
(−1.12) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
DEBTSTOC <Reference group> 
 
 <Reference group> 
 
NOSTOC 0.21** 
(2.06) 
0.16* 
(1.76) 
0.07 
(1.18) 
 0.04 
(0.33) 
−0.02 
(−0.20) 
−0.05 
(−0.57) 
SMALSTOC 0.05 
(0.47) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
−0.09 
(−1.14) 
 −0.05 
(−0.73) 
−0.13* 
(−1.88) 
−0.20*** 
(−2.67) 
MEDSTOC 0.24 
(1.34) 
0.16 
(0.93) 
−0.003 
(−0.03) 
 −0.13* 
(−1.69) 
−0.20 
(−1.16) 
−0.27** 
(−2.00) 
LARSTOC −0.10 
(−0.85) 
−0.15 
(−1.47) 
−0.25*** 
(−2.62) 
  −0.15 
 (−1.31) 
 −0.24*** 
 (−2.70) 
 −0.32*** 
 (−4.06) 
TOPSTOC 0.02 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
−0.13 
(−0.91) 
  0.29 
 (1.35) 
 0.11 
 (0.60) 
 −0.05 
 (−0.49) 
DEBTHOM <Reference group> 
 
 <Reference group> 
 
NOSHOM −0.31** 
(−2.28) 
−0.20* 
(−1.66) 
−0.24*** 
(−2.63) 
 −0.18 
(−1.64) 
−0.08 
(−0.97) 
−0.09 
(−1.13) 
SMALHOM −0.27* 
(−1.82) 
−0.15 
(−1.16) 
−0.18* 
(−1.88) 
 −0.14 
(−1.08) 
−0.05 
(−0.44) 
−0.04 
(−0.52) 
MEDHOM −0.24 
(−1.31) 
−0.11 
(−0.69) 
−0.18* 
(−1.69) 
 −0.13 
(−1.00) 
−0.05 
(−0.46) 
−0.04 
(−0.35) 
LARGHOM −0.49*** 
(−3.18) 
−0.36*** 
(−2.64) 
−0.38*** 
(−3.45) 
 −0.30 
 (−1.61) 
−0.18 
 (−1.13) 
−0.15 
(−1.17) 
TOPHOM −0.15 
(−0.74) 
−0.10 
(−0.47) 
−0.23 
(−1.16) 
 −0.56*** 
(−3.39) 
−
0.45*** 
(−3.57) 
−0.39*** 
 (−2.99) 
AGE 0.001 
(0.87) 
0.001 
(0.82) 
0.002 
(1.35) 
 0.003 
(1.62) 
0.003** 
(1.94) 
0.003** 
(2.05) 
SCHOOL 
 
−0.01 
(−1.10) 
−0.01 
(−0.94) 
−0.01 
(−0.90) 
 −0.01 
(−0.73) 
−0.01 
(−0.64) 
−0.01 
(−0.61) 
MALE −0.08* 
(−1.73) 
−0.07* 
(−1.74) 
−0.05 
(−1.58) 
 −0.09*** 
(−2.63) 
−0.09*** 
(−2.91) 
−0.06* 
(−1.67) 
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MARRI 0.08 
(1.33) 
0.11* 
(1.84) 
0.05 
(0.89) 
 0.16* 
(1.96) 
0.19** 
(2.35) 
0.13* 
(1.74) 
DIVO 0.04 
(0.76) 
0.08 
(1.43) 
0.06 
(1.65*) 
 0.04 
(0.63) 
0.09 
(1.34) 
0.13** 
(2.54) 
CONSV_1 <Reference group>  <Reference group> 
CONSV_2 −0.29** 
(−2.32) 
−0.26** 
(−2.40) 
  −0.27*** 
(−2.66) 
−0.24*** 
(−2.71) 
 
CONSV_3 −0.44*** 
(−3.08) 
−0.42*** 
(−3.60) 
  −0.36*** 
(−2.70) 
−0.32*** 
(−2.78) 
 
CONSV_4 −0.69*** 
(−4.15) 
−0.62*** 
(−4.33) 
   −0.69*** 
 (−5.26) 
 −0.60*** 
 (−5.35) 
 
CONSV_5 −0.37** 
(−2.11) 
−0.36** 
(−2.46) 
  −0.36* 
(−1.70) 
−0.38** 
(−2.10) 
 
WOKGOV <Reference group>  <Reference group> 
 
WOKPUB −0.11 
(−1.05) 
   −0.01 
(−0.13) 
  
WOKFIRM 0.005 
(0.12) 
   0.10 
(1.63) 
  
WOKSELF 
 
0.03 
(0.45) 
    0.11 
 (1.45) 
  
WOKOTHE 0.95 
(1.58) 
   0.46 
(1.26) 
  
WOKNO 0.22 
(1.62) 
   0.55*** 
(2.79) 
  
Marginal effect 
of CONFLICT: 
Pr (Y = 5) 
0.11 
(1.22) 
0.10 
(0.97) 
0.14* 
(1.84) 
 0.10 
(1.09) 
0.09 
(0.98) 
0.13 
(1.45) 
Log 
pseudo-likeliho
od 
−2,739 −3,068 −4,367  −2,263 −2,534 −3,644 
Observations. 2,074 2,229 3,380  2,082 2,306 3,401 
Note: Values without parentheses are coefficients. Values in parentheses are 
z−statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered per country. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Estimation results based on high-income sample (Ordered Probit) 
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 Estimation for preference for 
income redistribution 
Dependent variable: PRIDIST 
 Estimation for perceived income 
difference 
Dependent variable: DIFINCOM 
    (1) (2)  (3)   (4) (5)  (6) 
Country 
characteristics 
       
CONFLICT 0.97*** 
(4.27) 
0.88*** 
(4.08) 
0.71*** 
(4.10) 
 1.09*** 
(3.60) 
1.09*** 
(3.40) 
0.82*** 
(2.90) 
GINI 3.22*** 
(2.66) 
3.10*** 
(2.61) 
2.56** 
(2.26) 
 3.25** 
(2.10) 
3.23** 
(2.10) 
3.00* 
(1.88) 
Ln (GDP) −0.63** 
(−2.26) 
−0.61** 
(−2.18) 
−0.67*** 
(−3.67) 
 −0.58** 
(−2.14) 
−0.56** 
(−2.12) 
−0.68*** 
(−3.35) 
Ln (POP) −0.18** 
(−2.30) 
−0.17** 
(−2.33) 
−0.14** 
(−2.46) 
 −0.11 
(−1.38) 
−0.10 
(−1.31) 
−0.11 
(−1.64) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
DEBTSTOC <Reference group> 
 
 <Reference group> 
 
NOSTOC −0.05 
(−0.52) 
−0.04 
(−0.44) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
 0.11 
(0.82) 
0.12 
(0.90) 
0.18* 
(1.84) 
SMALSTOC −0.15 
(−1.64) 
−0.14 
(−1.49) 
−0.10 
(−1.55) 
 −0.07 
(−0.66) 
−0.05 
(−0.55) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
MEDSTOC −0.06 
(−0.80) 
−0.06 
(−0.77) 
−0.08 
(−1.12) 
 −0.12 
(−1.09) 
−0.11 
(−0.98) 
−0.04 
(−0.52) 
LARSTOC −0.25*** 
(−2.74) 
−0.25*** 
(−2.70) 
−0.22*** 
(−3.23) 
  −0.19* 
 (−1.75) 
 −0.19* 
 (−1.73) 
 −0.12 
 (−1.20) 
TOPSTOC −0.41*** 
(−3.70) 
−0.41*** 
(−4.06) 
−0.50*** 
(−5.04) 
  −0.37*** 
 (−3.18) 
 −0.38*** 
 (−3.17) 
 −0.38*** 
 (−3.14) 
DEBTHOM <Reference group> 
 
 <Reference group> 
 
NOSHOM 0.15 
(1.10) 
0.11 
(0.79) 
0.09 
(1.16) 
 −
0.001 
( −
0.01) 
0.
01 
(0.
06) 
0.0
1 
(0.
14) 
SMALHOM 0.01 
(0.05) 
−0.03 
(−0.25) 
−0.05 
(−0.90) 
 0.0
04 
(0.
03) 
−
0.001 
( −
0.01) 
−
0.02 
( −
0.25) 
MEDHOM 0.14 
(0.99) 
0.10 
(0.69) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
 0.11 
(0.61) 
0.11 
(0.61) 
0.03 
(0.29) 
LARGHOM 0.08 
(0.53) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
−0.06 
(−0.61) 
 0.01 
 (0.07) 
0.005 
 (0.03) 
−0.08 
 (−0.60) 
TOPHOM −0.05 
(−0.32) 
−0.10 
(−0.60) 
−0.24* 
(−1.89) 
 −0.21 
(−1.14) 
−0.21 
(−1.12) 
−0.31* 
(−1.96) 
AGE 0.01*** 
(2.94) 
0.01*** 
(2.69) 
0.01*** 
(2.93) 
 0.01*** 
(5.20) 
0.01*** 
(4.71) 
0.01*** 
(5.00) 
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SCHOOL 
 
−0.01 
(−1.48) 
−0.01 
(−1.22) 
−0.01 
(−1.09) 
 −0.01 
(−1.57) 
−0.01 
(−1.42) 
−0.01 
(−1.10) 
MALE −0.07* 
(−1.91) 
−0.10** 
(−2.33) 
−0.12*** 
(−2.95) 
 −0.10** 
(−2.20) 
−0.12** 
(−2.39) 
−0.11** 
(−2.40) 
MARRI −0.05* 
(−1.67) 
−0.06** 
(−2.14) 
−0.03 
(−1.08) 
 −0.05 
(−1.12) 
−0.06 
(−1.23) 
−0.03 
(−1.01) 
DIVO 0.03 
(0.26) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.98) 
 0.09 
(0.66) 
0.08 
(0.60) 
0.17* 
(1.84) 
CONSV_1 <Reference group>  <Reference group> 
CONSV_2 −0.37*** 
(−2.97) 
−0.37*** 
(−3.00) 
  −0.39** 
(−2.55) 
−0.35** 
(−2.33) 
 
CONSV_3 −0.66*** 
(−4.43) 
−0.67*** 
(−4.44) 
  −0.60*** 
(−3.33) 
−0.58*** 
(−3.20) 
 
CONSV_4 −1.02*** 
(−6.69) 
−1.03*** 
(−6.61) 
   −0.95*** 
 (−5.49) 
 −0.93*** 
 (−5.31) 
 
CONSV_5 −0.64** 
(−2.51) 
−0.66** 
(−2.51) 
  −0.66*** 
(−3.29) 
−0.61*** 
(−2.80) 
 
WOKGOV <Reference group>  <Reference group> 
 
WOKPUB −0.17* 
(−1.94) 
   −0.07 
(−0.78) 
  
WOKFIRM −0.13** 
(−2.36) 
   −0.07 
(−1.10) 
  
WOKSELF 
 
−0.27*** 
(−3.63) 
    −0.22*** 
 (−2.99) 
  
WOKOTHE −0.28 
(−0.53) 
   −0.23 
(−1.39) 
  
WOKNO −0.07 
(−0.33) 
   0.01 
(0.04) 
  
Marginal effect 
of CONFLICT: 
Pr (Y = 5) 
0.26*** 
(4.17) 
0.23*** 
(3.99) 
0.21*** 
(4.00) 
 0.39*** 
(3.65) 
0.35*** 
(3.45) 
0.30*** 
(2.89) 
Log 
pseudo−likelih
ood 
−5,157 −5,359 −7,419  −4,555 −4,721 −6,391  
Observations. 3,610 3,745 5,133  3,621 3,756 5,150 
Note: Values without parentheses are coefficients. Values in parentheses are 
z−statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the country. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
